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1 Introduction
Clearly, it is likely that when unions bargain with rms over wages they are also
inuenced by relative wage considerations.1 Brown, Gardner, Oswald and Qian
(2008), using data collected from 16,000 British workers, have found evidence that
the welfare of a worker is not solely determined by his or her material circumstances
but also depends on his or her relative wage and the rank-ordered position of his or
her wage within a comparison set.2 The purpose of this note is to provide a theo-
retical study of how relative concerns will a¤ect the outcome of wage negotiations
in presence of private information in a duopoly. To describe the wage bargaining
process, we adopt Rubinsteins (1982) alternating-o¤er bargaining model with two-
sided incomplete information, which allows the occurrence of strikes at equilibrium.
An increase in unionsrelative concerns has a twofold e¤ect on the strike activity.
On one hand, it raises the potential payo¤s for the union and the rm, and hence
longer strikes or lockouts may be needed for screening the private information. On
the other hand, each union is more inclined to concede and to accept rapidly a
smaller wage increase than before since the smaller increase in wage is compensated
by the increased utility due to more pride or less envy. Depending on which e¤ect
dominates, an increase in unionsrelative concerns will either raise or reduce the
strike activity.
The note is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model under complete informa-
tion is presented. Section 3 is devoted to the case with private information. Section
4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a duopolistic industry for a single homogenous product, where the
demand is linear and is given by p = a   q, p is the market price, and q is the
aggregate quantity demanded. Let qi denote the quantity produced by rm i, and
let i denote the prot of rm i. There is no entry or threat of entry, and both
rms are quantity setters (Cournot competition). Production technology exhibits
constant returns to scale with labor as the sole input and is normalized in such
a way that qi = li, where li is the labor input. The total labor cost to rm i of
1Hopkins (2008) has provided a survey of di¤erent theoretical models of relative concerns and
their relation to inequality. See also Sobel (2005).
2Clark and Oswald (1996), using data on 5,000 Bristish workers, have found evidence that
workersreported satisfaction levels are inversely related to their comparison wage rates.
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producing quantity qi is qiwi, where wi is the wage in rm i. Firm is prot is given
by i = (p   wi)qi. Firm i is unionized, and enters into a closed-shop agreement
with union i.
The objective of union i is to maximize the following utility function:
Ui(wi; wj) = wi   (wj   wi), (1)
where 1 >   0; i 6= j. In this utility function,  captures the loss from disad-
vantageous inequality (envy) if wj > wi, or the win from advantageous inequality
(pride) if wi > wj. This utility function is a special case of Fehr and Schmidts
(1999) model of inequality aversion: Ui(wi; wj) = wi   (wj   wi) if wj > wi and
Ui(wi; wj) = wi   (wi   wj) if wi > wj. The parameter  captures the envy or
the dislike of others having higher wages. If the parameter  is positive, then it
captures the compassion, that is, low wages for others reduce ones own utility. This
is the assumption originally made by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).3 But if, contrary to
Fehr and Schmidts assumptions, the parameter  were negative, then it captures
the pride as then lower wages for others raise an unions utility. So, the utility
function given in (1) reverts to assume that  is negative and equal to   in Fehr
and Schmidts (1999) model. That is, we assume that pride is as strong as envy and
there is no compassion.4 If  =  = 0 the utility function given in (1) reduces to
the standard utility function where the union maximizes the wage rate.
The unions utility function given in (1) implies that the union places no value on
employment. Although this may seem implausible, the notion that, in negotiating
wages, unions do not take into account the employment consequences of higher
wages has a long tradition, and is often stated by union leaders (Mauleon and
Vannetelbosch, 2005).5 This assumption is made to obtain closed-form solutions in
order to carry out the analysis under incomplete information. Cramton and Tracy
(2003) have concluded that disputes are largely motivated by the presence of private
3De Bruyn and Bolton (2008) have investigated whether fairness considerations are stable across
bargaining situations to be quantied and used to forecast bargaining behavior accurately. Using
data from experiments on two-person bargaining, they have found that the positive reciprocity
assumption of the Fehr-Schmidt model ( > 0) is violated.
4Brown, Gardner, Oswald and Qian (2008) have studied how British workers do make wage
comparisons. They have regressed employee satisfaction against both the average wage in the rm
and the employees rank in wages. Rank is found to be more important in predicting satisfaction.
This is more supportive of rivalrous preferences than of inequity aversion. So, workers seem to feel
envy or pride rather than envy or compassion when making wage comparisons.
5Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2005) have shown that, if the union is not too powerful, it is
optimal for the union that seeks to maximize the rents to send to the negotiating table delegates
who seeks to maximize the wage.
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information and the sharply conicting interests of the union and the rm over the
wage.
Interactions between market competition and wage bargaining are analyzed ac-
cording to a two-stage game. In stage one, wages are negotiated at the rm-level
in both rms. In stage two, each rm chooses its output (and hence employment)
levels, taking as given both (i) the output decisions of the other rm and (ii) the
negotiated wages. The model is solved backwards. In the last stage of the game, the
wage levels have already been determined. Both rms compete by choosing their
outputs simultaneously to maximize prots, with the price adjusting to clear the
market. The unique Nash equilibrium of this stage game yields
qi(wi; wj) =
a  2wi + wj
3
; i(wi; wj) =

a  2wi + wj
3
2
;
for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j. The Nash equilibrium outputs of a rm (and hence, the
equilibrium level of employment) are decreasing with its own wage, but are increasing
with the other rms wage and total industry demand.
The negotiations occur simultaneously in both rms and the agents are unaware
of any proposals made (or settlement reached) in related negotiations. Production
and market competition occur only when either both rms have come to an agree-
ment with their workers, or when one rm has settled with its union and the other
union has decided to leave the negotiation forever. Hence, each union-rm pair takes
the decisions of the other pair as given while conducting its own negotiation.
Each negotiation proceeds as in Rubinsteins (1982) alternating-o¤er bargaining
model. The union and the rm make alternate wage o¤ers, with the rm making
o¤ers in odd-numbered periods and the union making o¤ers in even-numbered pe-
riods. The length of each period is . The negotiation starts in period 0 and ends
when one of the negotiators accepts an o¤er. No limit is placed on the time that may
be expended in bargaining and perpetual disagreement is a possible outcome. The
union is assumed to be on strike in every period until an agreement is reached. The
union and the rm have time preferences with constant discount rates ru > 0 and
rf > 0, respectively. To capture the notion that the time it takes to come to terms
is small relative to the length of the contract, we assume that the time between
periods is very small. As the interval between o¤ers and countero¤ers shortens and
shrinks to zero, the alternating-o¤er model has a unique limiting subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE), which approximates the Nash bargaining solution to the bar-
gaining problem (see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986). Thus the predicted
wages are given by wi = argmax f  logUi   (1  )  log ig, where  2 (0; 1) is
the union bargaining power which is equal to rf=(rp+rf ) and the status quo payo¤s
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are zero. Then, the equilibrium wages (wi ), outputs (q

i ), and consumer surplus
(CS) are
wi =
(1 + )a
4  (3  ) ; q

i =
4(1  )a
3 (4  (3  )) ; CS
 =
32(1  )2a2
9 (4  (3  ))2 .
Of course, we have that @wi =@ > 0 (@U

i =@ > 0) and @

i =@ < 0. More
interestingly, we nd that @wi =@ > 0 (@U

i =@ > 0), @q

i =@ < 0, @

i =@ < 0,
and @CS=@ < 0.6
Proposition 1. An increase of unions relative concerns increases wages but de-
creases outputs, prots and consumer surplus.
Take as given the wage negotiated in the other rm. As  increases, each union
becomes less inclined to accept lower wages because of having to su¤er from more
envy. In addition, each union is now more persistent to obtain higher wages because
of getting more pride. Hence, the more the union cares about relative concerns the
higher the negotiated wages and the lower the prots of the rm.
3 Maximum delay in reaching an agreement
Both the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and Rubinsteins model predict e¢ -
cient outcomes of the bargaining process. In particular, agreement is reached imme-
diately. This is not true if we introduce incomplete information into the bargaining.
In this case, the early rounds of negotiation are used for information transmission
between the two negotiators. We now suppose that negotiators have private infor-
mation. Neither negotiator knows the impatience (or discount rate) of the other
party. It is common knowledge that the rms discount rate is included in the set
[rPf ; r
I
f ], where 0 < r
P
f  rIf , and that the unions discount rate is included in the
set [rPu ; r
I
u], where 0 < r
P
u  rIu. The superscripts I and P identify the most
impatient and most patient types, respectively. The types are independently drawn
from the set [rPi ; r
I
i ] according to the probability distribution pi, for i = u; f . This
uncertainty implies bounds on the unions bargaining power which are denoted by
 = rPf =(r
I
u + r
P
f ) and  = r
I
f=(r
P
u + r
I
f ). The wage bargaining game may involve
delay (strikes or lockouts), but not perpetual disagreement, in equilibrium.7 In fact,
delay is positively related to the distance between the discount rates of the most and
6These relationships hold under an alternative specication where unions maximize the surplus
and have relative concerns: Ui(wi; li; wj ; lj) = wili   (wj lj   wili).
7Watson (1998) has characterized the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) payo¤s which
may arise in Rubinsteins alternating-o¤er bargaining game and constructed bounds (which are
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least patient types of the players. If the range of types is reduced, then this leads
to a smaller range of possible payo¤s and less delay. Delay can occur even when the
game is close to one of complete information (as the type distributions converge to
point mass distributions).
We propose to identify strike activity with the maximum delay time in reaching
an agreement. Only on average is this measure a good proxy for actual strike
duration.8 In the appendix we compute the maximum delay in equilibrium which
shows that an agreement is reached in nite time and that delay time equals zero as
incomplete information vanishes (in that rPi and r
I
i converge). The maximum real
delay time in reaching an agreement is given by D() = min

Du(); Df ()
	
where
Du() =   1
rPu
 log
"
rPf
rIf
 (1 + )r
I
f + 4r
P
u
(1 + )rPf + 4r
I
u
#
(2)
is the maximum real time the union would spend negotiating, and
Df () =   1
rPf
 log
24rPu
rIu
2

 
(1 + )rPf + 4r
I
u
(1 + )rIf + 4r
P
u
!235 (3)
is the maximum real time the rm would spend negotiating. In fact, Du() is the
maximum real time the union would spend negotiating if it were of the most patient
type. Similarly, Df () is the maximum real time the rm would spend negotiating
if it were of the most patient type. So, Du(T ) and Df (T ) are the upper bounds
on the maximum time the union of type ru and the rm of type rf would spend
negotiating. Since Du(T ) and Df (T ) are positive, nite numbers, the maximum real
delay in reaching an agreement is nite and converges to zero as rIi and r
P
i become
close. We have that @Du()=@ < 0 and @Df ()=@ > 0.
met) on the agreements that may be made. The bounds and the PBE payo¤s set are determined
by the range of incomplete information and are easy to compute because they correspond to the
SPE payo¤s of two bargaining games with complete information. These two games are dened by
matching one players most impatient type with the opponents most patient type. In addition,
Watson (1998) has constructed equilibria with delay in which the types of each player behave
identically (no information is revealed in equilibrium), players use pure strategies, and players
make non-serious o¤ers until some appointed date.
8It is not uncommon in the literature on bargaining to analyze the maximum delay before
reaching an agreement. See, for instance, Cramton (1992) and Cai (2003). In the literature on
strikes, three di¤erent measures of strike activity are usually proposed: the strike incidence, the
strike duration, and the number of work days lost due to work stoppages. Since we allow for general
distributions over types and we may have a multiplicity of PBE, we are unable to compute these
measures of strike activity.
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Proposition 2. An increase of unions relative concerns decreases the maximum
real time the union would spend negotiating but increases the maximum real time
the rm would spend negotiating.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. An increase of unionsrela-
tive concerns ( increases) raises the potential payo¤s for the union and the rm,
and in expanding the payo¤ set (or range of possible payo¤s), also increases the
scope for delay (longer strikes or lockouts may be needed for screening the private
information). Hence, @Df ()=@ > 0. However, for the union, there is a second
e¤ect at play. When  increases, taking as given the wage agreement in the other
negotiation, each union is more inclined to concede and to accept rapidly a smaller
wage increase than before since the smaller increase in wage is compensated by the
increased utility due to more pride or less envy. This second e¤ect dominates the
rst one. Hence, @Du()=@ < 0.
We now provide an example of the maximum delay. In this example, let rPf =
rPu = r
P, rIf = r
I
u = r
I, rI = 0:36   rP with rP 2 [0:04; 0:18]. Table 1 gives the
integer part of the maximum delay for the di¤erent values of the parameter .9 We
observe that (i) the real delay time in reaching an agreement is not negligible: many
bargaining rounds may be needed in equilibrium before an agreement is reached; (ii)
Du and Df are increasing with the amount of private information
rPi   rIi; (iii) the
maximum delay D() is increasing more with  when  is small, and may decrease
when  and the amount of private information
rPi   rIi are large. For instance,
take rP = 0:05. Then, we observe that D(0) = 35; D(1=4) = 41; D(1=2) = 45;
D(3=4) = 48; and D(1) = 46. Results (i) and (ii) hold in general.
4 Conclusion
We have considered a model of wage determination with private information in a
duopoly. We have investigated the e¤ects of unions having relative concerns on
the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We have shown that an increase of
unionsrelative concerns has an ambiguous e¤ect on the strike activity. We have
assumed that rms were competing à la Cournot and were producing homogeneous
goods. Product di¤erentiation does not a¤ect qualitatively our results about the ef-
fect of unionsrelative concerns on wage negotiations. Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
9We can interpret ri as the annual discount rate and the numbers in Table 1 as the maximum
number of days needed to reach an agreement. Indeed, the integer part of the maximum delays
for  = 1=365 are exactly the numbers in Table 1. The data in Table 1 seem consistent with U.S.
strike durations as reported in Cramton and Tracy (1994).
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 1 3=4 1=2 1=4 0
rP Du Df Du Df Du Df Du Df Du Df
0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0.16 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
0.15 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 1
0.14 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 5 2
0.13 5 5 6 5 6 4 6 4 6 3
0.12 7 7 7 7 8 6 8 5 9 4
0.11 9 10 10 9 10 8 11 7 11 6
0.10 12 13 13 12 13 10 14 9 15 8
0.09 15 16 16 15 17 14 18 12 19 10
0.08 20 21 21 20 22 18 23 16 24 13
0.07 26 28 27 26 28 24 29 21 31 18
0.06 34 38 35 35 37 32 38 29 40 25
0.05 46 53 48 49 50 45 52 41 55 35
0.04 65 77 67 72 70 67 73 60 77 53
Table 1: Maximum delay in reaching an agreement
(2003) have shown that, when unions maximize rents, wages and strikes are in-
creasing with the degree of product di¤erentiation, and the strike activity is smaller
under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. However, an increase in mar-
ket competition does not always reduce the strike activity. For instance, Mauleon
and Vannetelbosch (2010) have shown that, from an initial situation of two-way
intra-industry trade, an increase in product market integration decreases the strike
activity. But, opening up markets to trade has an ambiguous e¤ect on the wage and
the strike activity.
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Appendix
A Maximum delay
The negotiation goes as in Rubinsteins (1982) alternating-o¤er bargaining model.
The rm and the union have time preferences with constant discount factors f 2
(0; 1) and u 2 (0; 1), respectively. It is assumed that each union-rm pair takes
the other wage settlement as given during the negotiation. For any wage bargaining
which leads to an agreement wi at period n, 
n
fi(wi; li(wi; wj)) and 
n
uU(wi; wj)
are, respectively, rm is payo¤ and union is payo¤. For any wage bargaining
which leads to perpetual disagreement, disagreement payo¤s are set to zero. As
in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), the SPE wage outcome is such that
i(wiu; li(wiu; wj)) = fi(wif ; li(wif ; wj)) and Ui(wif ; wj) = uU(wiu; wj), where
wiu is the SPE wage outcome if the union makes the rst wage o¤er, and wif is the
SPE wage outcome if the rm makes the rst o¤er. Since the union makes the rst
o¤er, the unique symmetric SPE wages are given by
wi (u; f ) =
(1 + )(1 pf )a
2(1 pfu)  (1  )(1 pf ) , i = 1; 2,
which is also the SPE unions payo¤s, Ui (u; f ), and from which we get the SPE
prots,
i (u; f ) =
4f (1  u)2 a2
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
2(1 pfu)  (1  )(1 pf )2 , i = 1; 2.
Suppose now that the players have private information. They are uncertain
about each othersdiscount factors. Player is discount factor is included in the
set [Ii; 
P
i ], where 0 < 
I
i  Pi < 1. Since we allow for general probability dis-
tributions over discount factors, multiplicity of PBE is not an exception. From
Watson (1998), we have that for any PBE, the payo¤ of the union belongs to
[Ui (
I
u; 
P
f ); U

i (
P
u ; 
I
f )] and the payo¤ of the rm belongs to [

i (
P
u ; 
I
f );

i (
I
u; 
P
f )].
The maximum number of bargaining periods the union would spend negotiating,
I (mu()), is given by Ui (
I
u; 
P
f ) =
 
Pu
mu()
Ui (
P
u ; 
I
f ), from which we obtain
mu() = (log(Pu))
 1 log

Ui (
I
u; 
P
f )=U

i (
P
u ; 
I
f )

. Notice that I (mu()) is simply
the integer part of mu(). It is customary to express the players discount fac-
tors in terms of discount rates, ru and rf , and the length of the bargaining period,
, according to the formula i = exp ( ri). With this interpretation, player is
type is identied with the discount rate ri, where ri 2 [rPi ; rIi ]. We thus have that
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Ii = exp( rIi) and Pi = exp( rPi ). Note that rIi  rPi since greater patience
implies a lower discount rate. As  approaches zero, using lHopitals rule we obtain
that
Du() = lim
!0
(mu() ) =   1
rPu
 log
"
rPf
rIf
 (1 + )r
I
f + 4r
P
u
(1 + )rPf + 4r
I
u
#
,
which is a positive, nite number. Notice that Du() converges to zero as rPi and r
I
i
become close. We have
@Du()
@
=
 4(rIfrIu   rPf rPu ) 
(1 + )rPf + 4r
I
u
  
(1 + )rIf + 4r
P
u

rPu
< 0.
The maximum number of bargaining periods the rm would spend negotiating,
I(mf ()), is given by i (
P
u ; 
I
f ) = (
P
f )
mf ()  i (Iu; Pf ), from which we obtain
mf () = (log(Pf ))
 1 log

i (
P
u ; 
I
f )=

i (
I
u; 
P
f )

, and as  approaches zero,
Df () = lim
!0
 
mf ()  =   1
rPf
 log
24rPu
rIu
2

 
(1 + )rPf + 4r
I
u
(1 + )rIf + 4r
P
u
!235 ,
which is a positive, nite number. We have
@Df ()
@
=
8(rIfr
I
u   rPf rPu ) 
(1 + )rPf + 4r
I
u
  
(1 + )rIf + 4r
P
u

rPf
> 0.
The maximum real delay time before reaching an agreement is given by D() =
min

Du(); Df ()
	
.
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